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CASENOTE
KNORR-BREMSE V. DANA CORPORATION-
WILLFUL PATENT INFRINGEMENT MAY NO
LONGER BE INFERRED EITHER FROM THE
FAILURE TO SEEK LEGAL ADVICE OR
INVOKING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE,
ACCORDING TO THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Sue Ann Motat
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided en
banc on September 13, 2004 that no adverse inference of willful
infringement of a patent may be drawn either from the failure to
obtain legal advice or the invocation of the attorney-client privilege
concerning the advice sought.' This landmark case, Knorr-Bremse
Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corporation,2
hereinafter Knorr-Bremse, overrules prior Federal Circuit precedent
3
and makes willful patent infringement 4 more difficult to prove, and
thus treble damages5 and attorneys' fees,6 more difficult to obtain, in
patent infringement suits.
This article will examine the historical precedent for an inference
of willful patent infringement either from the failure to receive legal
t Professor, Department of Legal Studies, Bowling Green State University; J.D.,
University of Toledo College of Law, Order of the Coif; M.A. and B.A., Bowling Green State
University. This author teaches in the BGSU Dana Executive MBA Program. This author has
only used public domain information in this article.
1. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2004); see infra notes 37-116 and accompanying text.
2. 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
3. See infra notes 20-35 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
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advice on the issue or the invocation of the attorney-client privilege
concerning advice sought. This article will then analyze Knorr-
Bremse, called one of the major appellate cases of 2004,7 in which the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit overruled their own prior
precedent to no longer allow such an inference. This article will
conclude with implications arising from this landmark case.
II. INFERENCE OF WILLFUL PATENT INFRINGEMENT FROM EITHER
FAILURE TO CONSULT LEGAL COUNSEL OR INVOKING THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The U.S. Patent Act defines a patent infringer as anyone who,
"without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States
any patented invention" during the patent term.8 A civil remedy is
available for patent infringement. 9 These civil damages are to be
adequate to compensate for the infringement, and, according to the
Patent Act section 284, may be increased by the court to up to three
times the amount found or assessed. 10 The court in exceptional cases,
may also award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party, under
the Patent Act section 285."
The increase in damages authorized by section 284 may occur
when the infringement is willful.' 2  No statutory standard sets the
circumstances under which the district court may find willfulness to
enhance damages.' 3  In determining willful infringement, the court
7. Eugenia S. Hansen & David McCombs, 2004 Legal Perspective: Intellectual
Property, 68 TEX. B.J. 48 (2005).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2005). Further, anyone who actively induces patent infringement
is also an infringer. Id. § 271(b). Whoever offers to sell or sells in the U.S. or imports into the
U.S. a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, knowing that the same to be
especially made or adapted for use in an infringement, is a contributory infringer. Id. § 271(c).
9. Id.§ 281.
10. Id. § 284. See generally, Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Enhanced
Damages and Attorney's Fees for Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 291 (2004).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2005).
12. See, e.g., Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that increased
damages are available to deter blatant, blind, and willful infringement of a valid patent); Great
N. Corp. v. Davis Core & Pad Co., 782 F.2d 159, 166-67 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that
enhanced damages are available where the infringer acted in wanton disregard of the patent
holder's rights); Dow Chem. Co. v. Chem. Cleaning, Inc., 434 F.2d 1212, 1214 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971) (holding that treble damages are allowed under 35 U.S.C. §
284 where the infringement is "conscious and deliberate", which substantially means "deliberate
and willful").
13. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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must find by clear and convincing evidence in the totality of the
circumstances 14 that the alleged infringer acted in disregard of the
patent and lacked a reasonable basis for believing that he had the right
to perform the infringing act. 15 The totality of the circumstances must
be weighed by the district court.
16
While there is no hard and fast per se rule for willfulness, 17 the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, has recognized
several factors which may be weighed in determining whether
damages should be enhanced. 18 These factors include: (1) whether the
infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another;
(2) whether the infringer, when the infringer knew of the patent
holder's patent protection, investigated the issue and had a good faith
belief that the patent was invalid or was not infringed; (3) the
infringer's behavior as a party to the litigation; (4) the defendant's
size and financial condition; (5) closeness of the case; (6) duration of
the infringer's misconduct; (7) the infringer's motivation for harm;
and (8) whether the defendant attempted to conceal his misconduct.' 9
Considering the second factor-investigating the issue and
forming a good faith belief of non-infringement-the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of non-willful
infringement and no enhanced damages when the alleged infringer
had a copy of the invention not marked "Patent Pending," and no
patent had been issued, when there was reasonable reliance on advice
of counsel.20  There are similar illustrative, but not exhaustive,
decisions involving advice of patent counsel. For example, the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a finding of willfulness
when a patent attorney evaluated the patent and advised the
defendants that their competing invention did not infringe. 2' The
same result of non-willful infringement occurred when the advice was
sought from in-house counsel, and the in-house counsel was a patent
22
attorney qualified to give an infringement opinion. An infringer
14. Gustafson, Inc., v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 510 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
15. WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
16. Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(affirming the district court's ruling disallowing attorney's fees).
17. Id.
18. Portec, 970 F.2d at 826-27; Rolls-Royce, 800 F.2d at 110.
19. Portec, 970 F.2d at 827.
20. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 948 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
21. Portec, 970 F.2d 816; see supra notes 13 and 19 and accompanying text.
22. Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Dart Indus., Inc., 862 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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who sought advice from both general counsel and a patent attorney,
and both said the infringer's invention was non-infringing, was also
not liable for increased damages or attorney fees for willfulness.23 A
different result occurred, however, when in-house counsel who was
not a patent attorney gave only brief and belated advice of
24noninfringement. This case, Underwater Devices, Incorporated v.
Morrison-Knudsen Company, established the principle that once
notice is received of an accusation of patent infringement the alleged
infringer has an affirmative duty to obtain an opinion letter from
qualified counsel.25
However, an alleged infringer who claimed advice of counsel
faced a double-edged sword. On the one side, the alleged infringer
would have to obtain legal advice to avoid a finding of willfulness.26
Then, the alleged infringer claiming advice of counsel to avoid a
finding of willfulness, prior to Knorr-Bremse,27 may have had to
disclose all of the opinions they had received from legal counsel.
28
The other side of the sword is that some of legal counsel's opinions
may have been unfavorable, even for other reasons unrelated to the
alleged infringement, and would have to be disclosed or the alleged
infringer would be inferred to be a willful infringer.29
The doctrine that legal counsel must be sought to avoid an
inference of willful patent infringement developed early in Federal
Circuit jurisprudence. In 1985, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit stated that a record devoid of opinions of legal counsel and
silent on the infringer's reaction to the existence of the patent may
lead to such a negative inference of willfulness.3 ° Subsequent Federal
Circuit jurisprudence refined the negative inference doctrine. 31
23. Julien v. Gomez & Andre Tractor Repairs, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 955, 960 (M.D. La.
1981).
24. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen, Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
25. Id. at 1389-90.
26. Id.
27. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see infra notes 37-116 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 418, 422-23 (M.D.N.C.
2003).
29. See Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1056-58
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
30. Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
31. Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1530-32 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Kloster
Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1579-80 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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Attorney fees may also be awarded under section 285 of the
Patent Act.3z As with the award of up to treble damages, attorney fees
may be awarded in exceptional cases, but a patent infringement case
is not exceptional within the meaning of this section of the Patent Act
where the infringer was actually advised by its patent attorney that its
invention did not infringe.33 However, the nonproduction of two
written attorney opinions, along with the production of an oral
opinion from an interested attorney, belatedly supported a jury verdict
of willful infringement for the purposes of trebling damages and
awarding attorney's fees.34 Thus, the positive duty to seek legal
advice and the negative inference for failure to seek such advice has
been applied to the grant of attorney fees in patent infringement
cases.35 In 2004, this was changed by Knorr-Bremse.36
III. KNORR-BREMSE V. DANA CORPORATION
Haldex Brake Products AB is a Swedish heavy brake component
manufacturer; Haldex Brake Products Corporation is the American
affiliate of Haldex AB.37 Together, Haldex began developing air disk
brakes in 1994, calling their first prototype the Mark 1.38 From 1995-
1997, Haldex developed the alternative design the Mark 11.39 In the
late 1990's, Dana Corporation, a Toledo, Ohio headquartered parts
manufacturer with its principal place of business in Kalamazoo,
Michigan,40 and Haldex made a joint agreement to manufacture and
32. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2005).
33. Abbott v. Barrentine Mfg. Co., 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 524, 526-27 (N.D. Miss. 1968).
34. Tenax Corp. v. Tensar Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881, 1885-86 (D. Md. 1991),
afd sub hain., Tenax Corp. v. RDB Plastotecnica S.p.A., 975 F.2d 868 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 986 (1992).
35. See Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed.
Cir. 1994); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
36. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
37. Haldex AB is a Swedish public company that manufactures hydraulic systems,
traction systems, brake systems, and parts, and spring wire used in valve springs, piston rings,
and fuel injection rings in cars, trucks, buses, construction equipment, and off-road vehicles. See
Hoover's Company Records - In-Depth Records, Haldex AB (Hoover ID: 128734), Mar. 15,
2005, LEXIS, Lexis-Nexis Library File. One of Haldex AB's main competitors is Dana. Id.; see
also Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 133 F. Supp. 2d 843,
846 (E.D.Va. 2001).
38. Knorr-Bremse, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 849.
39. Id.
40. Dana Corp. is a public company. See Hoover's Company Records - In-Depth
Records, Dana Corporation (Hoover ID: 10433), Mar. 15, 2005, LEXIS, Lexis-Nexis Library
File. "Although Dana Corporation doesn't make cars and trucks, it does manufacture the parts
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offer to sell air disk brakes in the U.S., although no such brakes were
ever sold in the U.S. 4 1 Pursuant to this joint agreement, Haldex sent
Dana between 100 and 200 Mark II air brakes free of charge for
testing in U.S. laboratories and on U.S. test tracks and roads.42
Approximately eighteen Dana vehicles were equipped with the Mark
II brakes.43 Haldex and Dana advertised the brakes at trade shows
and in industry media in the United States.44 Although the defendants
offered the Mark II brakes for sale, none were actually sold,45 due to a
decision by Dana.4 6
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH
47
(hereinafter Knorr-Bremse), a German corporation, is a leading
manufacturer of commercial air disk brakes and other products.48
Knorr-Bremse is the assignee of U.S. patent number 5,927,445 (the
'445 patent) for a disk brake for vehicles having an insensible
actuator, issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on July 27,
1999.49 According to the abstract for the invention, this disk brake for
road vehicles has a brake cast structure called a caliper that straddles
the disk brake. 50 On one side of the brake disk is a clamping unit
upon which an actuation cylinder can act.51 The caliper is a one-part
unit substantially closed on all sides; the clamping unit is inserted
preassembled into the side of the caliper facing the disk brake. 52 The
invention has at least one adjusting spindle with a pressure scheme.53
carmakers use to piece together new vehicles." Id.; see also Knorr-Bremse, 133 F. Supp. 2d at
847.
41. Knorr-Bremse, 133 F.Supp. 2d at 849.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 857.
45. Id. at 849
46. Id. at 857-58.
47. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH is a subsidiary of Knorr-Bremse
AG; the parent owns 60% of this subsidiary. See Major Companies Database, Knorr-Bremse AB
(Ref. No. E05355), Mar. 7, 2005, LEXIS, Lexis-Nexis Library File. The party Knorr-Bremse
AG is a private German company doing business internationally in the pump and pumping
equipment markets, as well as the motor vehicle body manufacturing market. See Standard &
Poor's Register of Corporations, Knorr-Bremse AG, Dec. 7, 2004, LEXIS, Lexis-Nexis Library
File.
48. Knorr-Bremse, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 846.
49. U.S. Pat. No. 5,927,445 (issued July 27, 1999).
50. Id. at Abstract.
51. Id.
52. Id. This one-piece design of the caliper is constructed in a cost-saving manner. Id. at
Description.
53. Id. at Description.
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The '445 patent consists of eleven claims,54 nine of which were
allegedly infringed. 5
Before the U.S. patent was issued, Knorr-Bremse, in December
1998, notified Dana orally that Knorr-Bremse had patent disputes
with Haldex in Europe over the Mark II brake, and told Dana that a
patent application was pending in the U.S. 56  Just over a month after
the '445 patent issued, Knorr-Bremse notified Dana in writing that the
patent had issued and of the infringement litigation in Europe with
Haldex 5 7  In May of 2000, Knorr-Bremse filed suit in the U.S.
against the three defendants, all major competitors of Knorr-
Bremse.
58
The three defendants answered, and denied that the Mark II
brake infringed any claim of the '445 patent 9  They also
counterclaimed, alleging that the '445 patent was invalid on grounds
54. The first claim of the '445 patent, an independent claim, is for a disk brake having a
one piece caliper which comprises a brake disk, on one side of which a brake application unit is
arranged. This unit is insertable as a preassembled unit and has a rotary lever which can be
displaced against a spring force. Claim two, an independent claim, is for the disk brake which,
when the application unit is inserted, is closed off. Claim three, a dependent claim, is for the
disk brake wherein the bridge may be operated by the eccentric of the rotary lever carrying two
adjusting spindles. Claim four, a dependent claim, is for a disk brake with the preassembled
application unit joined together by a bow element. Claim five, a dependent claim, is for a disk
brake with a bridge operated by the eccentric of the rotary lever carrying two adjusting spindles,
which have pressure pieces sealed off by bellows with the respect to the closing plate penetrated
by them. Claim six, a dependent claim, is for the bow element with a bow spring in the form of a
U-shaped bow around the rotary lever. Claim seven, a dependent claim, is for a disk brake with
the rotary lever carrying spindles screwed to it, and pressure pieces sealed off by bellows with
respect to the closing plate penetrated by them. Claim eight, a dependent claim, is for a disk
brake with the closing plate screwed to the caliper by means of studs. Claim nine, an
independent claim, is for a disk brake assembly for vehicles, comprising a brake disk, a caliper,
and a described brake application unit. Claim ten, a dependent claim, is for the disk brake
assembly unit with the caliper opening closed off by a closing plate penetrated by at least one
pressure piece. Claim eleven, an independent claim, is a method of making the disk brake
assembly for vehicles including a brake disk, a caliper, and a described brake application unit.
U.S. Pat. No. 5,927,445 (issued July 27, 1999).
55. Knorr-Bremse alleged that claims one through five and eight through eleven of the
'445 patent were infringed by the three defendants. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge
GMBH v. Dana Corp., 133 F. Supp. 2d 833, 836 (E.D. Va. 2001).
56. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
57. Id. In July 1999, right after the U.S. '445 patent was issued, Knorr-Bremse filed a
patent infringement suit against Haldex AB in Germany, alleging that the Mark II brake violated
the German version of the '445 patent. Id. At a meeting concerning this litigation Haldex
learned of the '445 patent. Knorr-Bremse, 133 F. Supp. 2d 833, 835 n.2 (memorandum opinion
memorializing the Markman hearing).
58. Knorr-Bremse, 133 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849.
59. Id.
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of obviousness and indefiniteness. 60  In September 2000, Haldex
presented to the district court the Mark III, a modified air disk brake
Haldex developed in an attempt to design around the '445 patent.61
Both sides requested summary judgment.62  The plaintiff
requested summary judgment for literal infringement of the Mark II
brake, and for literal infringement and infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents for the Mark III brake.63 The defendants
moved for summary judgment of non-infringement and thus, no
damages for the Mark II brake, and for non-infringement for the Mark
III brake.64 As the parties disputed various terms used in the patent
claims at issue, all parties moved for claim construction under
Markman v. Westview Instruments.
65
A Markman hearing was held in November 2000, and the district
court granted Knorr-Bremse's motion for summary judgment of
literal infringement of the '445 patent by the Mark II air disk brakes,
and granted the defendants' motion for a finding of no damages
arising out of this literal infringement.66 A bench trial ensued in
January 2000.
At trial, the district court found that plaintiffs expert established
by a preponderance of the evidence that every element of all nine
claims of the '445 patent at issue read on the Mark III air disk brake,
therefore literal infringement exists.67
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 849-50.
63. Id. at 850.
64. Knorr-Bremse, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 849-50.
65. Id. at 850; see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)
(holding that a question of a disputed claim is a question of law). See generally Sue Ann Mota,
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.: Patent Construction is Within the Exclusive Province
of the Court Under the Seventh Amendment, 3 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3 (1997), available at
http://www.richmond.edu/joit/v3i1/mota.html.
66. Knorr-Bremse, 133 F. Supp. 2d 833, 835 n.2, 836 (memorandum opinion). The
disputed claim terms were construed as follows after the Markman hearing. "Caliper" was
defined as "a structure composed of those housing portions that engage about the brake disk and
contain a brake application unit." Id. at 839. "One-piece caliper" was defined as "a caliper
constructed or formed as a single, integral piece." Id. at 840. "Largely closed" and "substantially
closed" were defined as "for the most part, to a large degree, or in the main closed." Id.
"Rearward area" was defined as "the area facing away from the brake disk." Id. "Application
unit" was defined as "a mechanical mechanism that multiplies an input force using a lever to
provide a greater output force that presses the brake shoes against the brake disk." Id.
"Preassembled" was defined as "assembled beforehand." Id. Summary judgment concerning the
Mark III brake was denied. Id at 843.
67. Knorr-Bremse, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 851, 859. The parties stipulated that Dana
purchased and used the Mark III in the U.S., that Haldex Corp. and Haldex AB imported and
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Defendants claimed that the '445 patent was invalid both on the
grounds of obviousness and indefiniteness. 68 The district court ruled
that the defendants did not carry their burden of establishing by clear
and convincing evidence that the '445 patent was obvious in light of
the prior art.69 Similarly, the defendants did not carry their burden of
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the '445 patent
was invalid due to indefiniteness.7°
The district court further held that there was willful infringement
of the '445 patent by use of the Mark II air disk brake, and awarded
attorney's fees.7 ' This was the only issue appealed by the
defendants.72
Although there are no hard and fast per se rules to determine
willfulness of patent infringement, willfulness is determined by
whether, from a totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person
would prudently act with any confidence that a court might find the
offered for sale the Mark III in the U.S., and Haldex Corp. sold the Mark III in the U.S. Id. at
856. Knorr-Bremse did not allege willfulness as to the Mark III air disk brake and withdrew its
request for infringement damages concerning the Mark III. Id. at 846 n.3.
68. Id. at 849.
69. Id. at 860. Issued patents are presumed to be valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2005). The
burden of establishing invalidity of a patent claim for obviousness rests on the party raising the
claim. Id. The party must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that a patent claim is invalid
due to obviousness by showing that the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art. Id. § 103(a). The
defendants attempted to meet this burden by five prior art references. The five references,
however, were considered by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office examiner, either as a cited
reference to the '445 patent or to an American counterpart to the cited reference. Knorr-Bremse,
133 F. Supp. 2d at 860. While an expert's opinion on the ultimate legal conclusion of
obviousness is not required, the defendants did not offer expert testimony concerning the lack of
ordinary skill in the prior art, the scope and content of the prior art, or the differences between
the prior art and the claims at issue. Id. at 856. Thus, the presumption of validity of the '445
patent was not overcome. Id. at 861.
70. Knorr-Bremse, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 862. The party claiming invalidity must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the patent claims and specifications are insufficiently precise
so that they do not allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to determine whether there is
infringement. Id. at 861. The district court held that this burden was not met. Id. Instead,
"defendants' attempt to design around the '445 patent with the Mark III air disk brake was
unsuccessful not because the '445 patent claims and specifications were fatally indefinite, but
rather because defendants were unwilling to relinquish the essential advantages of the '445
patent." Id. at 862.
71. Id. at 863-64. See generally, Thomas Presson, Knorr-Bremse and Questions about
Production of an Exculpatory Legal Opinion and the Adverse Inference, 44 IDEA 409 (2003).
72. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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patent infringed.7 3 In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has held that there is an affirmative duty that usually requires
the potential infringer to obtain competent legal advice before
engaging in any potentially infringing activity. 7 Furthermore, if the
alleged infringer does not produce exculpatory opinion of counsel, an
inference may be drawn that either no opinion was obtained, or if one
was, it was unfavorable.75
In the instant case, once Haldex became aware of the '445
patent, Haldex obtained verbal opinions, and at least one written
opinion, from American counsel. 76 Haldex, however, did not waive
its attorney-client privilege.77  Dana and Haldex had an
indemnification agreement, under which Haldex agreed to indemnify
Dana for any legal fees, expenses, or damages, or any combinations
thereof, as a result of this litigation.78 Thus, Dana relied exclusively
on Haldex to handle infringement issues and did not obtain legal
opinions or conduct an independent patent search or investigation
regarding the '445 patent.79 These facts and circumstances led the
district court to rule that there was willful infringement of the '445
patent.8 0
The district court then had to conduct an analysis of whether the
prevailing party had shown that this was an "exceptional" case,81 and
if so, whether attorney's fees were appropriate. 2 The district court
held that, while there was no bad faith litigation or inequitable
conduct on the part of the defendants, this was an "exceptional"
case.8 3  Knorr-Bremse was awarded attorney's fees, in connection
73. Knorr-Bremse, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 862 (citing Hall v. Aqua Queen Mfg., Inc., 93 F.3d
1548, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The court cited the factors set out in Rolls Royce Ltd. v. GTE
Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
74. Knorr-Bremse, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 862 (citing Comark Communications, Inc. v.
Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
75. Id. (citing Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1056
(Fed. Cir. 1994)).
76. Id. at 857.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 857-58 n.20.
79. Id. at 857.
80. Knorr-Bremse, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 862-63.
81. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2005).
82. Knorr-Bremse, 133 F. Supp. 2d. at 864.
83. Id.
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with the Mark II brake.84 No damages were awarded since there were
no sales of the infringer's brakes.
85
The defendants/appellants appealed only the issue of willfulness
and the resulting award of attorney fees. 86  The plaintiff/appellee
cross-appealed in an attempt to enjoin the defendants from retaining
and using the brake performance records and test data concerning the
Mark II air disk brake.87 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
sua sponte took the case en banc88 to reconsider its precedent
concerning drawing negative inferences from parties' actions
regarding legal counsel, and invoking the attorney-client privilege
concerning any advice received.8 9 Four questions were specifically
addressed. First, when the attorney-client privilege and/or work
product privilege is invoked by a defendant in an infringement suit, is
it appropriate for the trier of fact to draw an adverse inference with
respect to willful infringement? 90 Second, when the defendant has not
obtained legal advice, is it appropriate to draw an adverse inference
with respect to willful infringement?9' Third, if the court concludes
that the law should be changed, and the adverse inference withdrawn
as applied to this case, what are the consequences for this case?
92
Fourth, should the existence of a substantial defense to infringement
be sufficient to defeat liability for willful infringement even if no
legal advice has been secured?
93
84. Id. Attorney's fees were unwarranted for work performed concerning the Mark III
brake. Id.
85. Knorr-Bremse, 133 F. Supp. 2d. at 842.
86. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
87. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMZBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
88. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 344 F.3d 1336,
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
89. Id. (citing Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir.
1983)).
90. Knorr-Bremse, 344 F.3d at 1336.
91. Id. at 1337.
92. Id. One author has noted that it is interesting that the court requested briefing on this
issue as it is not squarely before the court, and any opinion is merely dicta on this point.
Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 227,
229 n.8 (2004).
93. Knorr-Bremse, 344 F.3d at 1337. The court also welcomed amicus curiae briefs from
bar associations, trade or industry associations, and government entities. Id. at 1337. Twenty-
four amicus curiae briefs were received. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v.
Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1339-40, 1341 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Many argued that the failure to
obtain a legal opinion should not created an adverse inference, and the exercise of the attorney-
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The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in September 2004
overruled its own precedent, and established that no negative
inferences may be drawn from either failure to obtain or failure to
produce an exculpatory opinion from legal counsel concerning
potential patent infringement. 94  The court first examined the
historical setting of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
because special justification is necessary to depart from precedent. At
the time the court was created patent rights were disregarded which
resulted in the undermining of the incentive for innovation.95 In 1982,
the Federal Courts Improvement Act96 created the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, giving it exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
most patent cases, making patent rights more stable and predictable.97
In 1983, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recognized the
legal importance of respect for valid patent rights, and held that there
is an affirmative duty to determine whether one is infringing.98 In
recent years, the underlying reasons for the precedent of the negative
inference have diminished, according to the appellate court.99 The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit obviously believes that there
client privilege should not be the basis of a negative inference. See, e.g., George E. Hutchinson
& Robert L. Baechtold, Brief of Amicus Curiae, the Federal Circuit Bar Association in
Response to the Court's Inviting Briefs for the En Banc Hearing in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp. 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 289 (2003). One brief advocated that the
adverse inference is unfounded, but it should be eliminated only prospectively. Brief for Amici
Curiae Computer Associates et al. at 2, 11, Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH
v. Dana Corp, 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 01-1357, 01-1376, 02-1221, 02-1256),
available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/faculty/lemley/pubs/briefs/knorrvdana.doc (last visited
Apr. 28, 2005). The Association of the Bar of the City of New York split the difference, arguing
in its brief, in support of neither party, that an adverse inference where a party has not obtained
legal advice is appropriate, but there should be no adverse inference for refusal to waive the
privilege. Brief for Amicus Curiae The Association of the Bar of the City of New York at 2, 6-
7, 9, Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp, 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (Nos. 01-1357, 01-1376, 02-1221, 02-1256), available at 2003 WL 23200558. Also,
the Association's Committee on Patents' vote on each question was split, with a majority vote
for each but no overwhelming vote for anyone position. Id. at 2.
94. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
95. Id. at 1343.
96. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 24 (1982).
Policy justifications for granting the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit exclusive
jurisdiction over patent cases included greater uniformity in patent law development and
application, more stable patent rights, and elimination of forum shopping in patent litigation.
See, e.g., Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of
Willful Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 77 (2001).
97. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 96, at 77.
98. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudson Co. 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
99. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343-45.
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is more uniformity in enforcing patent rights, and more respect for
patent rights, making the reasons for the negative inference not as
compelling in 2004 as they were in 1983.'1°
Examining each of the four questions, 10 1 the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit first ruled that the adverse inference drawn
from invocation of the attorney-client privilege is no longer to be
drawn, bringing patent cases in line with other areas of the law.
0 2
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege for confidential
communication known to common law,10 3 and the adverse inference
can distort this privilege. 1' 4
Examining the second question posed, the appeals court
similarly held that no negative inference may be drawn from failure to
obtain legal advice.'0 5 There remains however, an affirmative duty of
care to avoid infringement of known patent rights. 1
06
Concerning the third question, the consequences for the case, the
appeals court vacated both the finding of willful infringement based
on these negative inferences, and the resulting award of attorney
fees. 107 On remand, if willful infringement could be restored on other
grounds, the attorney fee award may be revisited.1
08
Finally, the court declined to adopt a per se rule that the
existence of a substantial defense to infringement is sufficient to
defeat liability for willful infringement, even if no legal advice is
secured. 09 The totality of circumstances still is to be considered, with
the trier of fact according each factor the weight warranted."0 Thus,
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit overruled its own
precedent concerning the negative inferences."'
100. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 24 (1982).
101. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 344 F.3d
1336, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
102. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344-45. Of course, a party may choose to waive the
attorney-client privilege but no negative inference may be drawn from failure to do so. Id. at
1345.
103. Id. at 1344 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
104. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344.
105. Id. at 1345-46.
106. Id. at 1345.
107. Id. at 1346-47.
108. Id. at 1347.
109. Id.
110. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1347. The ruling on Knorr-Bremse's cross-appeal was
affirmed. Much of the technical data were obtained before the patent was issued, and some data
related to non-infringing aspects, thus the decision not to order destruction was offered. Id.
111. Id. See generally Michael Abramowicz, A Unified Economic Theory of
Noninfringement Opinions, 14 FED. CtR. B.J. 241, 243 (2004); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the
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Judge Dyk, concurring in part and dissenting in part, concurred
concerning the elimination of the adverse inference arising from
failure to seek legal counsel, but dissented concerning the affirmative
duty to exercise due care to determine if there is infringement.
12
According to the dissent, the duty of due care requirement "finds no
support in the patent damages statute, the legislative history, or
Supreme Court opinions. ' 1 3 It is merely, according to the dissent, a
"relic of the past" that should be eliminated.' 4 There is a question
also, according to the dissent, of whether the due care requirement is
consistent with Supreme Court cases holding that punitive damages
may only be awarded in situations where the conduct is
reprehensible." 5 Since enhanced damages are a form of punitive
damages, and failure to exercise due care is not in and of itself
reprehensible, the "failure to comply with the due care requirement
cannot be squared with those recent Supreme Court cases."
' 16
Shortly after its en banc ruling, a panel of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in October 2004 cited the ruling in Knorr-
Bremse to vacate a district court's determination of willful
infringement based at least in part on the failure to obtain an opinion
of counsel.' 1 7 The case was remanded to determine willfulness based
on the totality of circumstances." 18 District courts have also cited the
landmark holding in Knorr-Bremse."1
9
Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157
(2004).
112. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1348 (Dyk, J., conurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
For the affirmative duty, see id. at 1345.
113. Id. at 1349.
114. Id. at 1352.
115. Id. at 1348. See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
116. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1348-49.
117. Instituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
118. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit also cited the totality of the
circumstances standard from Knorr-Bremse in Fuji Photo Film, Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
119. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd. v. Mergen Ltd., 345 F. Supp. 2d 431, 442 (D. Del. 2004);
Lasermax, Inc. v. Glatter, No. 01 Civ. 6500 (LMM), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21771, at *16
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2004); Collaboration Props., Inc. v. Polycom, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 473, 477 n.4
(N.D. Cal. 2004); Terra Novo, Inc., v. Golden Gate Prods., Inc., No. C-03-2684 MMC EDL,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20429, at *6, *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2004). But see Cartier, Inc. v. Four
Star Jewelry Creations, Inc. 348 F. Supp. 2d 217, 248-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that Knorr-
Bremse is inapposite to the facts in this case).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Knorr-Bremse is a precedent-reversing landmark case decided
by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and holds promise to
be oft cited on the issue of the negative inferences which may no
longer be used to find willfulness in patent infringement suits.1
2
'
While there may have been valid historical reasons for the negative
inferences, 22 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that
there are no longer valid reasons to support a finding of willful patent
infringement from either the failure to obtain legal advice or the
failure to produce any legal opinions obtained concerning potential
patent infringement. 1
23
This author agrees with the outcome in Knorr-Bremse. First, the
negative inference of willful patent infringement from failure to
obtain legal advice is unwarranted. It could be an expensive
proposition for a small inventor or business to seek and obtain an
independent legal opinion each time there could be a potential
infringement. There could be other ways to meet the due care burden
still required by the majority in Knorr-Bremse, 124 short of obtaining
an independent legal opinion. While seeking legal advice is still
advisable, it is no longer mandatory to avoid a finding of willful
patent infringement.
The negative inference which had previously been drawn from
invocation of the attorney-client privilege is also properly overturned,
according to this author. Liability for willful patent infringement
should not be inferred from invoking the privilege; there may be other
reasons than willful patent infringement for invoking the privilege.
The lawyer-client relationship and resulting communications should
be encouraged, to maximize the value of the legal advice received.
125
The client may waive the privilege, but should not be penalized for
not waiving it, as occurred to Haldex in the district court.12 6 The
holding in Knorr-Bremse now allows defendants in patent
120. 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
121. Id. at 1340.
122. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
123. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1341.
124. Id. at 1345.
125. "The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications known to common law .... The privilege recognizes that [the public goal
served by the privilege] depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client." Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
126. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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infringement cases to use the attorney-client privilege as parties in
other types of cases are allowed to do.
Willful patent infringement is charged in more than ninety
percent of all patent suits, and enhanced damages for willful
infringement are awarded about one-third of the time, according to
Professor Kimberly Moore of George Mason University School of
Law. 127 While plaintiffs no longer may infer willful infringement
from the negative inferences, willful infringement may still be, and
will continue to be, 128 determined from the totality of the
circumstances. Whether or not the duty of due care requirement
raised by Judge Dyk in his dissent' 29 survives still remains to be seen.
127. William M. Bulkeley, Patent Ruling Irks Inventors, Aids Companies, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 2, 2005, at B 1.
128. See, e.g., supra note 118 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 112-116 and accompanying text.
